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Issues and Suggestions for the Study of Industrial Organization
in a Regime of Rapid Technical Change
Richard R. Nelson*
Yale University

My assignment is to consider the treatment of technical change in the
industrial organization literature and to discuss how I think the fact and
the goal of technical advance should impinge on analysis of industrial

organization.

Since several recent books have surveyed the literature,

I will concentrate on the second part of my assignment--key issues that require
rethinking and research. 1 I shall be concerned particularly with problems
in economic theory--the basic conceptual frames that researchers in the in

dustrial organization field have to work with.
on twee na~n topics.

My remarks will be focused

First, the firm as an innovating and adaptive organization.

Second, the operation of market competition and other (including non-market)
command and control mechanisms in a dynamic environment.

Third, some problems

of public poilcy in sectors and situations where technical change is important~
all of these areas I will be crudely summarizing (and anticipating) ideas
that Sidney Winter and I are developing. 2

On

The Firm as an Innovating and Adaptive Organization
The theory of the firm exists at at least two analytic levels.

At

the formal level the theory postulates a set of rather simple characteristics
*The author is indebted to M.J. Peck and R.E. Evenson for helpful comments
although they are implicated in no way. Sidney Winter is responsible for the
good ideas.
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of an arch-type firm,

The formal theory rests on a deeper body of thought

which I shall call "appreciative" theory, which attempts to structure
qualitative notions about the nature of the firm and its activities in a
manner generally less rigorous but richer than at the formal level.

While

the theory of the firm at the simpler, more formal, level has a sharper analytic
cutting edge, and is more capable of generating, or proving, implications,
the premises and arguments used to specify and justify the formal models
rest on appeal to the more basic appreciation of the firm.

Further, much of

applied research in economics is guided by the appreciative theory at least
as much as the formal theory.

This certainly characterizes much of the

research in industrial organization.

It is my contention that many researchers

in the industrial organization fi~ld are working with an appreciative theory
that is quite different from that underlving our textbook formal models.

And

they recognize this and somehow feel guilty about it--not theoretically kosher.
Bluntly, I do not think that the traditional theory of the firm is
adequate for analysis of industries in which technical change is
important.

I think that the industrial organization economist's appreciative

theory of the firm is better than the appreciative theory of the full time
theorist, and further provides a good basis for formal theory of an interesting
and useful sort.

The points I will make abut on the long standing debate about

the theory of the firm--behavioralism, managerialism, and all that--but perhaps
even more they are Schumpeterian.

I will begin by questioning our traditional

theory of the firm at the appreciative level, and then go on to ask some
questions about what it is legitimate to assume about firms in the simple,
formal models used in the theory of industry behavior.
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In traditional theory the firm is viewed, first of all, as a unit;
I will not argue about this point here;;but some of my later remarks are
strengthened if one recognizes that there are many people, and sub-organizations
in firms that must somehow be organized,

Second, the behavior of the firm

is viewed as subjectively rational in the non-trivial sense th~t the firm
has some objectives in mind and some rather firmly held reasons for doing
what it is doing--(at one extreme "calculations", at the least arguments
based on "experience"), and objectively rational in that it would not be
economist", who understands the decision problem, to find
3
Thir.d,
signifjcantly better policies for the firm than those being chosen,

trivial for an

11

the firm is viewed as being able to operate reliably and efficiently a variety
of "technologies", subject to the constraint of availability of the necessary inputs (including the machinery, skill, etc.); however these constraints
are assumed to be not particularly binding over the time period relevant to
the analysis, hence the firm is viewed to a first approximation as being able
to employ effectively any technology that any other firm can,

I have asserted

these elements of appreciative theory in a drastically terse way, while in
fact the-appreciative theory is laden with complexity, nuances, qualifications.
exceptions,

I maintain, however, that this is a fair characterization of those

aspects of appreciative theory to which we appeal in constructing more formal
models.
Once one begins to move from appreciative to formal theory this vision
of the firm leads naturally to a model that assumes firms maximize some
objective (the deeper theory does not necessarily imply profit) subject to the
~

constraint of a production function and demand and supply equations.

Since
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subjective and objective maximization are the same, the firm can be expected
to behave according to the optimizing rules the economic analyst computes,
which is extremely convenient,

The deeper model almost suggests that all

firms are pretty much the same or, rather, provides no reasons why they
should be different, and in the absence of speical reasons for postulating
differences in technological capabilities, access to markets, or of motivation
this generally is what we end up assuming in the formal modeling.

This is

convenient because then we can get on with the business of modeling
industry behavior on the basis of appeal to a typical firm.

And later on

the theory generates various survival arguments that can be invoked to further
justify this assumption.
We end up with a theory which--at the analytical cutting edge level-
views the firm as a competent clerk.

This is so both in main line positive

theory, and as the economist's norm.

Firms carry out certain well-defined,

widely-known activities, using generally available resources, picking the
activities and their levels according to well-defined, easily computable
(and optimum) decision rules.

In positive theory this characteriaation

exactly fits competitive theory under the special case where all firms
(including the potential entrants) possess the same production sets,

It

is slightly unfair when applied to oligopoly theory where firm differences

in production sets, supply conditions, and reaction functions are admitted
in some models, or to monopoly where the monopolist is de facto unique.
But the theory still gives the impression that one set of oligopolists, or
one ,monopolist, is pretty much like any other,

In normative theory also

the characterization exactly fits the analysis of the optimality properties
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of competitive equilibrium, with some awkwardness creeping in regarding
oligopoly when considering research and development behavior, but the
"interchangeab le clerks" image is strong throughout.

This image of the firm,

of course, stems from our proclivity in our theory to take the technologies,
resources, and demands as given,
job done "efficiently."

Thus the "economic problem 11 is to get the

Bread and automobiles are to be produced in the

right quantities and in the right ways given the preferences, resources, and
technologies available to the economy.
distribution,)

(Let me ignore the question of

A competitive market provides clear signals as to what is to

be done; following the signals is a straightforward business.
This is a plausible characterizatio n of parts of the economic problem
and might be a good overall characterizatio n (with appropriate market failure
caveats) in a world of no real change; the circular flow world of Chapter I

in Schumpeter's Jheory of Economic Development where:
"The data which have governed the economic system in the past are
familiar, and if they remain unchanged the system will continue
in the same way. n3
This is also a world in which a variety of plausible "learning" mechanisms
pull the teeth of the "technological knowledge is not a public good" and
"maximization is difficult if not impossible" arguments, and in which Friedman
Alchian evolution-sur vival arguments seem to go through (with some important
1

caveats that I will not discuss here).
The circular flow, mechanical interchangeable firms, view probably can
keep its footing, if shakily, in a world of smooth predictable change--like
exponentially growing factor supplies and consequent changes in demands.
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In some models technical change is treated consistently with this view-
indeed Schumpeter himself in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, talks
about the "routinization of innovation" bringing it, as·it were, back into
his (now dynamized) circular flow models, 5
But if technical change, and adjustment and accomodation to it, can
ultimately be routinized, this certainly has not occured yet, 6
inherently creative and personalized,

Innovation is

In the world of Schumpeter's Chapter III,

"While in the accustomed circular flow every individual can act
promptly and rationally because he is sure of his ground and is supported
by the conduct, as adjusted to this circular flow, of all other
individuals, we in turn expect the accustomed activity from him,
he cannot simply do this when he is confronted by a new task."
"Carrying out a new plan and acting according to a customary one are
things as different as making a road and walking along it. 11 7
Economic theory simply has not grasped this distinction.

Perhaps the most

apparent and striking failure of theory is the proclivity to treat Rand D
as "another form of investment," with, perhaps, an unusual amount of uncer~
tainty.

But this statement, at the appreciative theory level, just does not

characterize adequately the kinds of experimenting, error making, partial
correcting, insightful or blind behavior that seems to go on in major Rand D.
Nor does it appear an adequate general characterization of firms trying to do
things they have not done before, even though other firms have.

Recall

Kaiser's (unsuccessful) attempts to master the automobile business. 8
fail, and succeed,

Firms

Our positive theory at the present time does not seem

to have room for this kind of purposive, but groping behavior, that seems
to characterize firms' operations in a regime of rapid technical change.

-7Nor does our normative theory adequately deal with this.

It is clear that

in many important sectors and situations not only is innovation important
hut is an important part of what we want firms to do.

To hit this point hard

let me shift focus here from the (implicit) context of private goods and
markets to the public sector, and broaden the con~ept of "firm" to include
organizations of unspecified legal form.

In the traditional public finance

literature the task of the public bureaucracy (plus contractors) is viewed
as analogous to the task of the firm in competitive theory--carrying out
activities to provide "public goods" and (more usually) services.

Yet a

large share of the important programs are better viewed as trying to solve
problems, where the solution is likely to require new hardware, or a new way
of doing things, or a new program, hence "innovation" by the standard defini
Project Apollo is the most striking example.

tion..

Much of what we are trying

to achieve in defense procurement also is hardware innovation.

Or, consider

the "War on Poverty" wheri e much of what we are trying to do is find (and then
implement) programs that will work rather than "operating" existing programs
( which are felt to be unsatisfactory) .

I shifted to public sector activity because here it is easier to see
that quite often what we are asking the organizations to do is "innovate",
and not meet a well specified demand in an efficient (and well known) way.
Yet clearly this also characterizes what we expect from (and get from) firms
in a large number of "private good," "market organized" sectors.

While we

hear too much about "progress being our most important product," as theorists
we have refused to absorb any of this.
boyant:

McNamara's statement is a bit flam
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"What in the end is management's most fundamental task? It is to
deal with change, Management is the gate through which social,
political, economic, and technological change--indeed change in every
dimension--is rationally and effectively spread through society, 119

But

we have to get much more of this flavor in our theory of the firm,
The present main line appreciative theory has no real room for this,

and industrial organization economists long have known this in their bones.

In

an environment of rapid technical change it is implausibxe to describe behavior
in terms of concepts like "subjectively rational"--except perhaps in the
trivial sense that the firm is trying to do as well as it can, has some
clues as to appropriate behavior, and if it clearly saw ways to be doing better
it would be doing them,

But one would expect to find firms often having neither

articulate reasons nor appeals to experience to justify what they are doing,
and indeed being somewhat nervous about it,

It certainly seems inappropriate

to view behavior as being objectively rational in any non-trivial sense; in
particular there is no case that the firm will behave according to the rules
the "economist" calculates as optimal.

And for obvious reasons it certainly

seems a bad misspecification to assume that a firm has access--over the
relevant analytical period--to any technology to which any other firm has
access.

For all of these reasons there is no justification for sliding

into the notion of a "typical" firm in a dynamic environment; indeed what
appears important is that individual firms are unique.

In short, the firm

cannot be viewed any longer as a competent, easily predictable, interchangeable,
clerk working in a well structured environment on well defined tasks,

Rather,

the firm must be viewed as attempting to keep its footing and to make progress
in a poorly structured and changing environment by trying and ~o.fumg new things
as appropriate.
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At the level of appreciative theory, how should we characterize a firm,
ideally in a way that is consistent with the traditional perspective where that
is appropriate?

Let me appeal here to the literature on organization theory

and the behavioral theory of the firm for justification of a presumption that,
whether as the result of

11

rational analysis" or not, the firm at any time

operates according to s set of decision rules that link environmental stimuli

10
.
to responses on t h e part of t h e f irm.

In the traditional theory it is

analytically convenient to break out some aspects of these "decision rules"
as "technology" and separate these from others which can be characterized
as "higher level decision rules."

There are some severe difficulties with

this clean split but I will not go into these here.

In any case the theory

of the firm aims for a convenient, and as simple as possible, characterization
of these decision rules,

If this can be deduced from, or assumed to be the

result of, "maximization" this may be convenient but it is not necessary to
the theory as long as the analyst can specify them somehow.

Indeed a perfectly

viable theory would simply declare the existence of these rules and certain
aspects of their "form" and that they are stable and constant.
is much of what the "maximization" theory does.

This really

All that the maximization

connotation accomplishes is to make the specification plasusible.
In the traditional theory these decision rules--both higher order and
technological--are viewed as capable of invoking a wide range of firm responses
to a considerable domain of environmental stimuli--prices, etc.
makes comparative statics work.

This is what

Let me again appeal to the organizational

literature to suggest that, rather, we should assume that the built-in
decision rules of a firm apply to only a small domain of environmental condi
tions and are capable of invoking only a limited range of responses.

Put
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another way the firm at any time commands only a small set of activities
ahd has thought through responses to only a limited range of market contingencies.,
This, it seems to be, should be an explicit part of the theory.

It implies

that, unless other aspects of the theory permit one to deduce otherwise, at
any time in an industry one might well expect considerable diversity among
firms in terms of their operating decision rules.
The model of the firm needs two dynamic components,

One is specification

of what determines the expansion or contr>action of the firm (rather,
of employment of the decision rules it is using).

the level

That is the theory needs

a sub-model of "widening" investment.
In addition there needs to be an analysis of mechanisms that will induce
firms to change their decision rules,

The assumption that the firm's decision

rules at any time are limited and simple means that in an environment of change 1
either of external market conditions or of perceived technological possibilities 1
the firm often will find itself in situations where its built in rules are,
or are felt to be, inappropriate.

In our analysis of the process by which

firms change their decision rules (perhaps higher order as well as technology)
it seems important to be much more sophisticated than we have been about
modeling two different (although far from independent) kinds of mechanisms.
One essentially is the processes of assessment and search that are largely
internal to the firm.

Here an obvious one is research and development,

but I also would include here doing operations research, market analysis,
management contemplation, etc., where the firm is scrutinizing its own
operations and searching for ways to improve them.

It seems useful to me

to distinguish these "internal" assessment and search process from another

-11(undoubtedly linked) class of activities that look to what other firms are
doing.

In this latter class the firm is looking to sources of improvement

by examining the behavior of other (presumably successful? ) firms.

While

the internal search and the external scan mechanisms clearly should be related
at the level of appreciativ e theory, at the formal theory level the first
class can be viewed as generating innovations (not necessarily improvement s)
and the second class diffusion models.

While the purpose of these activities

is to improve performance I think it would be a grave mistake to assume that
they do so reliably.

Nor does it seem appropriate to assume that these

mechanisms are working all the time on the full range of firm activities and
procedures.

Indeed, characteriz ing what things capture the attention of

the "intelligenc e" mechanism and

11

turn it on," and the nature of the "search"

process would seem to require theoretical delicacy, and a lot of empirical
investigatio n.

11

And clearly firms differ in these characteris tics.

The explicit recognition that many of the decision rules, perhaps
particularly technology, are subject to more than very occasional change
of course reduces the attractiven ess of a theory that appeals to stable
decision rules.

I wuold like to propose, however, that in an environment of

rapid ,hange where the lower order rules may be quite unstable, one might
hope to find more stability in the qualitative "meta" rules that gUide how
the rules change.

Thus one might well be able to identify and describe

the intelligenc e mechanism of a firm, its Rand D style, the broad strategy
that guides its search for improvement s.

These surely are more difficult

to describe in a simple way than the kinds of rules on pricing (for example)
that have been uncovered.

But at the level of appreciativ e theory it does

seem plabusible that firms can be characteriz ed in these dimensions in an

-12-

illuminating way.

Further, it seems plausible that it is at this level that

we can find and characterize the "sensible" response to change characterizations
of firm behavior--like if wage rates rise significantly search for ways to cut
down use of labor--that we work so hard to deduce from our optimization models.
12
One does not need an "optimization" model to predict "sensible" behavior.
It is clear that at least some industrial organization economists,
writing about important firms in industries cl:laracterized by rapid technologi
cal change, have in fact been applying something like this kind of an appre
ciative theory.

They have been digging into and trying to characterize

pricing policies and investment rules, without really trying to deduce these
from optimization assumptions.
of some interest to researchers.

Differences among firms have been a natter
In some of the literature there have been

attempts to characterize the Rand D philosophy of a firm, or its overall
strategy.

13

Thus tr.e non-traditional appreciative theory apparently meets the test
of serving as a useful framework for empirical investigation.

However one

cannot rest comfortable with an appreciative theory in the absence of seeing
what a formal theory, consistent with it, looks like.

In the first place,

while there inherently is a bit of fuzziness in appreciative theory, having
and working with a formal theory serves to keep the fuzziness within bounds,
and to sharpen up the appreciative theory.

Second, as will be elaborated

shortly, the theory of the firm is mainly used as a c~mponent of the theory
of industry behavior, in which a more summary, formal, and manipulable model
of firm behavior is needed.

Thus it seems important to try to develop a formal

theory of the firm consonant with the appreciative theory sketched above (which
I suggest is not consistent with the traditional formal theory of the firm).
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What is required is a formal theory of firm behavior that is consistent
with traditional theory when appropriate, yet is also capable of modeling the
innovative and adaptive firm where that is appropriate,
clearly specified in the appreciative theory.

The guidelines are

The firm at any time should be

described by the decision rules it is following and its size.

These rules

determine whatever endogenous variables the theory aims to explain as a
function of a variety of external variables.

The firm also needs characterization

in terms of its expansion and contraction rules.and, to anticipate the theory
of industry behavior, we need specification of what will trigger "entry" of
a firm that is not in the industry.

Several models of this sort already exist. 14

However, for a model capable of really generating and responding to technological
change, it seems essential to incorporate the two kinds of "learning" processes
discussed above--some kind of an innovating or internal search for improvement
mechanism, and some kind of an imitation mechanism whereby what one firm
does can induce another firm to do likewise. 15
specifications that might be employed.

There are a variety of

However it seems essential that at least

the "innovation" generating mechanism not be specified as "objectively rational. 1116
The burden of prediction that the systems moves in an objectively rational direction
should rest on specification of the mechanism on the diffusion machinery, and
on responses to market pressure,

It would appear that such a theory can be

built, and is capable of generating some interesting and plausible implications.
The merit of such a formal theory, as suggested akove, is mainly to be found
at the level of our theory of the industry, to which I now turn.
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Dynamic Market Competition and Other Forms of Innovation
Generating and Selecting Environments

Economists, particularly industrial organization economists, seldom
are interested in the behavior of particular firms, but rather in the behavior

of industries or sectors.

The sector is usually (but not always) o~mprised

of a number of firms whose behavior cannot be assumed to be independent.
Further, the dimensions of sector behavior in which we are most inter.ested
usually involve, in an essential if often summary way, specification of
what is going on outside the particular group of firms comprising the sector.
We have a traditoin of viewing firms as means, not ends.

Thus in our theory

of industry behavior we are concerned with the way in which "demands" for
·the output of the sector get generated, and the extent to which the sector satisfies
these demands.

We also have an appreciation of general equilibrium consider•

ations even in our partial equilibrium analysis, thus we are concerned with
the "costs" of operating the sector at various levels and ways, and the extent
to which the sector operates to minimise real costs at any level of operati,on_,
and balances marginal benefits and costs.
T,hus in conceptualizing at the industry level we generally employ a
greatly stripped down and simplified theory of the firm.

In addition to

specification of the characteristics of firms, our theory of the industry
or sector, both at the appreciative and the formal modeling level, involves
specification of the environment within which firms operate.

The "market"

in traditional theory is a model of such an environment which determines
the signals, incentives, and constraints which impinge on firms and thus on
their behavior.

In the traditional theory the environment is determined

·~ 15 ..,

by two classes of factors.

One is the behavior of the "outsiders" particularly

those who demand the good or service the firms in the sector can provide,
and those who supply inputs which have alternative uses or values.

The

other is behavior of the internal system taken as a group--the competition
that goes on among the indi'lfidual .;ffirms.

Thus the m~rket is at once a connec

ting link between demanders and suppliers of both products and inputs, and
a constraining structure of the behavior of the inBiiers:

in short, an

apparatus of command (through effective demand) and control (through competition),
There are many other kinds of command and control structures, such as those
that characterize primary education and medicine, or the foreign policy
establishment.

I take it that the command and control structure is the referent

of "organization" in the subject of industrial organization and that although
we tend to concentrate on "markets" (just as we have tended to concentrate
on firms which aim for a profit) the subject matter of industrial organization
in principle includes non·--market command and control structures (and organi
zations with objectives defined in terms other than profit).
I make these more or less obvious remarks so that we can be clear that
the traditional theory of industry behavior in a market environment is a
special case.

In the traditional theory the signals and incentive generation

mechanism is modelled as well-perceived product demand and factor supply
curves.

The internal control environment is deduced from the condition

that no firm (not just any particular firm) can imporve its profit conditions~
Clearly our modelling of sectors which are not controlled by the markets
would be somewhat different.

However our analysis of market sectors, and

non-market sectors, has been dominated by notions of steady state equilibrium
associated with our notions of firms as clerks working in a well defined
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and relatively constant environment .

17

The discussion in the preceding section suggests that this positive
theory does not adequately characteriz e the environment of firms where
technical change is rapid.

The assumption of a well-percei ved demand curve

for product or supply curve for input is plausible enly if one can describe
mechanisms whereby those curves in fact get well perceived.

This would

seem to imply considerabl e experience on the part of the firms in the industry
in the relevant regime of demand and supply conditions.

This clearly cannot

be assumed in an environment of rapid change either in demand or in supply
conditions.

In particular it seems completely implausible in considering the

demand for a major innovation.

Nor under these conditions does it seem plausi

ble to model the environmen tal constraints in terms of industry equilibrium
for that is not where the action is going on.

If the industry or proalem

we are concerned with looks like one in which we can expect change in the
"equilibrium conditions" which is rapid relative to the speed with·which
equilibrium is approached, or even in which one doubts that equilibrium
(perhaps constant) will be closely approached during the relevant time interval,
one should not play equilibrium games.

Rather one has to work with an ex

plicitly dynamic model of firm and industry behavior.

The competitive

environment of any firm is provided by the others moving toward equilibrium .
but not by their presence there.
The problem is not just in positive theory as a framework for description
and explanation ; it is in normative theory as a framework for evaluating
performance .

If doing things better is a good part of what we are trying

to call forth, the market cannot be conceived of strictly as a mechanism to
"control clerks" (which is the image of Langian socialists as well as of
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nee-classic al economists who believe that actually having competition may
be easier than getting the decision rules of competition followed without
really having real competition ).

Rather the market has to be viewed as a

mechanism stimulating new mutation (innovation s) and doing a creditable
job of somehow discriminat ing among the good and the bad, spreading the former
and killing the latter~

Even in an environment where rapid technologic al

change is occurring and is highly ~iued, this is far from all that we want
from all that we want from a market control system.

In addition we want

that system to stimulate and enforce the nee-classic al virtures of economic
efficiency, both in the appropriate level~~ output and in the minimum economic
cost sense.

But since these are going to be changing over time, here too market

.
d in
. t erms o f s t·imu1a t"ing moves in
cont rol must be viewe
. th e rig
. ht d"1rect1on.
·
lS
Again let me focus on public sector activity to hammer home the point-•
as well as to introduce a policy issue that I will treat in the following section
The 1960's marked the burgeoning of interest in systems analysis (or costbenefit analysis or any of a number of titles) as a tool for governmenta l
decision making.
Secretary?

Thinking of the decision maker (the systems analyst? the Cabinet

the President?) as commanding a bureaucracy under him led to a sharp

split between the public finance literature where demands (decisions) automatical ly
were fulfilled and the industrial organizatio n literature where demands had to
draw forth responses by impinging on a (market) environment of potential suppliers.
As experience has accumulated the clean lines that once used to exist between
industrial organizatio n and public finance have been destroyed.

There has been

growing appreciatio n that getting the program performed (the demand met) required
the appropriate responses on the part of a variety of organizatio ns, public and
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.
private.

And it
. b ecame increasing
.
. 1 y apparent tat
h
h. was no trivia
· . l requirement
'
tis
~ 19

Getting the education or health industries to do what the federal government
wants it to be doing turns out to be extremely hard.

Here part of the difficulty

resides in that the federal government is only one of many who are trying to get
the system to do what they want.

But President after President has found it

difficult if not impossible to get the State Department to do what he wanted. 20
The point I am trying to make is that having a well wo~king command and control
structure over a group of "firms" is no trivial matter and that non-market
sectors have the same command and control problems as the market sector.
However, note that to a considerabl e degree where the non-market sectors
seem to be falling down is an effective adaptation to change--tec hnological
and other,

The education sector has been failing to develop appropriate responses

to the rise in teacher salarie.s which we would have hoped would have generated
some effective search for ways to increase the pupil-teach er ratio through increased
capital intensity or mere efficient techniques of teaching.

And it has failed

abysmally to respond to the changing nature of the demands put upon it, largely
learning how to educate children from non-middle class families with non-middle
class values, but also how to e:lucate bored middle class kids and how to operate
integrated

schools.

Similarly the health sector has not learned to respond to

r-ising physicians'· s7J.:--.r.:'..u and fees, and the changing nature of demands put on it.
These~ and I su.cgcst most impo1~tant kinds of responses to changing factor
prices and demands tha.t we i,rant of an economic sector, and get out of some,
do not seem characteriza bJ.~ by the nee-classic al allegory,

As stressed in

Section I, that allego:t:'y implies much mo1'e complex decision rules keyed to a
richer domain of possible external situations and range of responses than we have
any reason to assume.

For impor~ant (large) changes, say in relative factor costs
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or in demands, I do not think that we can assume firms have an "already thought
through" response or that they can think through to a response ex-ante that is
subjectively and objectively rational.

Rather the response has to be considered

as an innovation which may or may not turn out to be really economic or really
responsive.
Some evidence on this, and some implications for the theory of "markets"
and other forms of command and control structures, is provided by what has
happened to the perception of "systems analysis" over the past few years
particularly in domestic programs.

I think it fair to say that in the mid-

1960's there was a faith that with good analysis we could reliably choose
among alternative programs on the basis of data gathered and analysis done
ex-ante even though these programs were in large part untried and the demands
had never before been adequately met.

We felt we could do this without

actually really observing the alternatives in action,

In effect the faith here

was closely analogous to the economic theorist's allegory about the wide range
of choices and circumstances over which the firm can make rational choices
ex-ante.

As experience accumulated it became clearer and clearer that there

seldom was sufficient information ex-ante to make reliable bets, and that at
the least ex-ante analysis had to be complemented by ex-post evaluations.

More

recently of course thinking about rational policy development has moved more
and more toward conscious experimentalism, with the role of the analyst seen as
that of setting up a number of experi~ntal programs to obtain data and to

try them out, and then on the basis of later data generated in the course of
21
·
.
.
t h e menu o f a 1 ternatives.
or mo d 1. f ying
t h e program, select ing

In short

the model of how public programs should be chosen has moved fro.m the rational choice
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ex-ante paradigm to a paradigm which explicitly recognizes that the problem is
that of trying out new things, and getting appropriate feedback for screening
and selection.

There is no reason to believe the situation is much different in market
sectors.

While public sector industries seem to have unusual difficulties

particularly in selecting and spreading good innovations, in the private sector
as well as the public dynamic processes seem necessa•.'Y to characterize in terms
of a flow of innovations, many of which are no improvement at all, mechanisms of
selection, and diffusion,

Traditional theory that relies heavily on equilibrium

conc~pts seems to abstract away from these phenomena and their implications.

A good

dynamic industry model, I suggest, incorporates a stripped dovm version of the
theory of the firm proposed in the preceding sections.

Many people have granted

that a quasi behavioral model has appeal as a model of a particular firm but have
doubted whether it can be incorporated into an industry ~.actor.

The claim here is

that it can, indeed it is the natural model of the firm to use in a model which
includes the possibility of dynamic competition.

Firms are characterized by their

technologies and static decision ru•es, and also by the way they generate innovations,
ex.p.and

o:i:?'.,

contract as a function of their profitability, (imitate successful) innovat

ions of others.

What are the required components of a theory of command and control

structure (competition) in an environment where rapid technological change is
desired or occurring?

The objective is to model "demands" and "competitive

pressures" in a way that fits our proposed general model, that is consonant with
traditiori~i. theory where that is appropriate, but which also characterizes more
adequately a dynamic changing environment where that is appropriate.
First, there has to be much more sophistication in modeling the "demand for
innovation."

There are significant probl?ems in positive modeling,

It cannot simply
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be assumed that there is a well perceived demand curve.

One has to get a

realistic specification of the speed with which consumers assess the pluses and
minuses of the new innovation and in turn how this affects the signals and
profitability of the innovating firm.

There also are some major normative issues.

In a dynamic environment it is doubtful that consumers immediately assess
accurately the properties of the new products--there are real issues to be considered
regarding the effectiveness of consumer evaluation procedures.

While economists

increasingly are looking at problems of externalities,; these would appear to
warrant even more consideration in an environment where rapid change is occurring.
There may be something to the argument that with enough time forces of self interest
will cope with the externalities problem.

However, the mechanisms that get

externalities reflected in bargains and in incentives to producers cannot be
assumed to work quickly,

One would expect externalities to be rampant in an

environment of rapid technical change.
Second, the dynamics of interactive behavior of the group of firms in the
sector needs to be modeled quite carefully.

The analysis needs to trace through

the manner in which the responses of consumers to an innovation, and of the
innovating firm to the success of its innovation, change the environment for
other firms and in turn affect their behavior, which feeds back, etc. 22

The

nature of the expansion and contraction, and entry and exit behavior of the firms
clearly is an important characteristic of the dynamic sector environemnt.
In addition to asking the extent to which improved performance gets reflected
in higher profit, one must ask how sensitive are expansion and contraction
rates to profitability (using the term as a general proxy for whatever the
organization aims for)?

How sensitive are entry rates to the average pro

fitability of firms in being?

Are these limits on firm size (or more saliently
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on the extent to which particular firms can and will use a particular tech
nology or innovation)? To the ~Rt~nt eKpan~ion rate§ are not particularly
sensitive to "profit", or there are sharp limits on ulitmate size 9 the
efficiency of dynamic response is deterred directly, and also indirectly
because (under plausible models) less pressure is put on the non-innovatol:"s,
One is tempted to conjecture that sectors in which individual organizations
are bounded geographically (schools?) provide a less dynamically stimulating
environment than those in which growth of any particular organization is not
closely bounded.

But in any case it would seem that analysis of this kind

of question is important in studies of any particular sector,
Successful innovations spread in part through growth of the innovators,
in part through imitation.

It is apparent that in market sectors both

mechanisms are at work, although the relative importance of each does not
appear to have been studied much and probably varies from sector to sector.
It is important to note that the two mechanisms are not independent.

In

public or non-profit sedtors the "expansion of the innovator" mechanism is
largely or totally scotched.

This means that a desirable innovation cannot

be spread without imitation.

At the same time it means that little or no spur

is put to organizations to adopt; there is no; build up of competitive
pressure on the "public monopoly."
There are some compensating considerations.

In particular while the

incentive to imitate is weakened when the innovating unit cannot or will not
e)4:and 9 at the same time there is no incentive for the innovators to try to
deter imitation (which for example is the role of the patent system in the
private sector).

Organizations that cannot expand, and who know others
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cannot, have little to gain by preventin g others from adopting their
successfu l practices .

Much of the (still remaining ) faith in the ability to

diffuse successfu l innovatio ns through publicly structure d sectors, despite
the lack of any clear cut profit-lik e incentive and despite the existence
of sharp boundarie s on organizat ional size, rests in a faith in the apparatus
,,

for generatin g imitation .

However, we know precious little abo~t "diffusio n"

mechanisms and patterns of a sector should be a prime topic for investiga tion
,,

in studies of industria l organizat ion in an environme nt of change.
/

If

§ff®

can assume that the speed of consumer response and strength of

feed-back to suppliers for better or lower price products is great enough,
expan:;ion and contracti on rules are sensitive enough to "profit", and that
imitation mechanisms work quickly and reliably relative to the pace at which
innovatio ns occur, then it seems reasonabl e to model the environme nt in terms
of equilibriu m condition s.

But in a world of rapid innovatio n, one must pay
explicit attention to the transient s. 24 It does seem possible to develop a
general model that is capable of generatin g competiti on in the nee-class ical
sense, and competiti on as Schumpete r described it, depending on what one
assumes about key parameter values,

And which it is in any partiucla r

sector clearly makes a differenc e, both in terms of positive descripti on
and analysis, and in terms of the major public policy issues to watch out for.
Policy Issues
In this concludin g section I will discuss, in summary form, two major
policy issues involving industria l organizat ion in a regime of actual, or
desired, rapid technolog ical change.

These are worthwhil e discussin g for
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their own sake, but also for the opportunity they afford to develop further in
a concrete setting some of the points made abstractly in the preceding two
sections.

The first involves issues in trying to program very rapid technological

advance in particular sectors.

The second involves problems of generating,

selecting, and diffusing innovation in public sector or mixed industries.
Programming of rapid_technological advance.

As remarked earlier, in

Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter presented the vision of
a future world in which major innovation was routinized,

In his New Industrial

State Galbraith suggests that this stage essentially now has been reached
in the large American corporations, and Servan Schriever takes a similar
position regarding practice in the United States,

The standard economist's

model incorporating R and D likewise is consonant with this perception, treating
Rand Das basically an investment decision not unlike most others.
The theoretical restructuring proposed in the preceding section conflicts
strongly with this point of view.

In several places I insisted that the

innovation process not be modeled as objectively rational either in the
sense that outcomes can be closely predicted in advance or in the sense that
outside experts (the economists?) would agree on the predictions.

Relatedly

I insisted that a good fraction of innovations are not improvements.

In

the "industry" modeling of technical change I rested considerable weight
on the gener>ation of a ,·-ariety of innovations and hence on processes of
ex-post evaluation and selection.
This disagreement about the nature of the innovation process is important
not only for modeling but also for policy.

If one believes the routinization

of innovation--R and D a.s investment---theory ~ then one soon is drawn toward

-25looking to Rand D, focused on particular national problems, as not just a
promising but a reliable instrument for public policy.

Further, belief in

the reliability of the instrument naturally leads one to analyze in advance
the range of alternatives~ pick the one that looks best, and put your chips
on it,

If, on the other hand, one believes that Rand Dis extremely uncertain

one adopts a "let a thousand flowers bloom" point of view, sees Rand Das
an interesting perhaps highly promising policy instrument, but does not treat
the instrument as reliable, hence hedges both by using other instruments and
by spreading the Rand D bets.

The first approach leads to the Defense style

of Rand D, and to such forced paced programs as the Super Sonic Transport
and the breeder reactor program of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The second

perception leads your in public sector areas, to spreading of funds such as
done by the National Institutes of Health, and in private sector areas of
seeking to encourage a diversity of research and development, private as well

. 25
as pu bl1.c.
History seems much more consonant with the mutation-selection model.
One of the most striking impressions of the history of technological advance
in most American industries is the diversity of sources,

New products, processes,

inputs, equipment for an industry have come from many different firms in the
industry, suppliers, purchasers, new entrants to the industry, outside
individual inventors.
not pan out.

Many developments that early seemed very promising did

Many important breakthroughs were relatively unexpected and were

not supported by the experts in the field.

While detailed histories are not

plentiful and many of these do not shed light on the question, one has the
impression that in most of the technically progressive industries, like chemicals,
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and electroni cs, most of the bad bets were rather quickly abandoned ,
particula rly if someone else was coming up with a better solution, and good
ideas generally had a variety of paths to get their case heard.
The post mid-1950 1 s military research and developme nt programs, the civil
reactor program of the Atomic Energy Commissio n, and experienc e to date with
the Super Sonic Transport , is a sad contrast.

In these areas the early batting

average has been dismal, just as it has been in the domain of decentral ized
developm ent.

But there aas been a proclivit y to stick with game plan,

despite mounting evidence that it is not a good one, that appears only in
exception al cases in areas wher.e Rand D was more decentral ized and competiti ve.
The case of Convair throwing good money after bad on the 880 developme nt
rightly is regarded as an aberratio n, and the fact that General Dynamics
had learned its style in military Rand D undoubted ly was a contribut ing
factor.
Rand D.

But this kind of thing is the rule, not the exception , in military
The B-58 and TFX Were pushed a11 the waY through developme nt despite

mounting unfavorab le evidence.

The B-70 and Skybolt were halted short of

procureme nt but long after the signals were clear that they were bad ideas.
It is a good bet that Boeing would not have persisted so long in pushing its
swing wing SST design had the bulk of the funds been its own and had it the
expectati ons of a market test against alternati ves.

I think the signals are

clear> enough that the present design is in trouble.

It is the monopoly

position and lack of pressure from an alternati ve that carries the project
forward in its present conceptio n.

Similarly , throughou t the history of

the AEC's power reactor program, there have been complaint s that the AEC was
persistin g in Rand Don designs long after evidence had accumulat ed that this
was not an attractiv e route, and conversel y, that the AEC has been very sticky
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about initiating work on new concepts.
The problem transcends the likely inefficiency and high cost of
innovation in industries where the mutation-selection model is not applied.
These sectors are likely to end up with a far too limited range of choice, and
further with. the government as a powerful ,1c,;:,byist for the particular
technologies.

It is rather surprising that the producers of coal and oil,

and of power generating equipment using conventional fuels, have not raised
more noise than they h~ve regarding the pressure being applied to the
utilities by the AEC to install nuclear rather than conventional power.
While the evidence on the nature of thermal pollution and nuclear waste
problems now is far f1~om c!f,,0.r, and nuclear power still probably looks
good compared to conventional power regarding pollution and waste problems,
I think we should feel some discomfort that a strong government lobby has a
stake in the issue.

There has been more vocal concern about the implications

of a governmental financial stake in the SST, perhaps because of the explicit
"revenue sharing" provisions in the program.

But even without a financial

stake, the higher executives and congressmen who support the programss/·/
/
have a personal credibility stake in the success of the products_,.and
processes

they push so hard.

/

It is relatively clear tr.dt:: the success 9f the SST program,

measured in almost any dimension that has been tal1':?{i a90ut, will depend highly
on the fare structure as a].lowed and encouraged by tne CAB.

The CAB can go a

long way towards mald.n_;.:; the SST program a fi11ancial success, by fighting for

and uniform fares ( s::i tha·~ the lower> cost technology will not be able to compete
in the dimension whc~c' it is st-.r>ongest).

1'hese are the kinds of consequences
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one runs into, I suggest, when one tries to predict and plan innovation
closely, rather than viewing the innovation process as one of mutation and
selection.
'l'it.e problem of achieving dynamic efficiency in the pub..ic sector.

Earlier

I made the point that the prob:em of efficiency in public sector activities
is, in good part, a problem of industrial organization.

We economists have

neglected this perspective before because of our lack of attention to the way
that public goods or services get provided.

Implicitly we have assumed that

once the public decision was Ir.a.de (we spent a lot of attention on how that should
be done) it was as good as effected.

It now is clear that the public decision

(even assuming there is such a clean cut thi-r.g) has to be treated like a
"demand" in the theory of industry bahavior, for tltte appropriate actions usually
must be drawn forth from institutions--often some private as well as public-who cannot be assumed to jump simply because the President or the Secretary
says to jump,

And very often the institutional structure provides the President

or the public with no ~r limited alternative sources; there is no real competitive
mechanism,
The combination of the demand characteristics of public sector activities,
and the organizational structl.lr'e of the sector, apparently yield serious
problems in a dynamic environment.

I think most of us would agree that the

dynamic pel'fJrmance of too large a fraction of the public and non-public sector
has been extremely poor.

While I have not collected any numbers and don't ev~~
. .

know what numbers I should collect, my impression is that the average public
sector batting average is much wprse than the performance, on average. of sectors
~".
where the command and control mechanism is based on a real market for final
\

.

products which links consumer satisfaction rather tightly to the profit or other

success measures of the firms.
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The problem is not characterizable as too little research and development.
In some sectors--like education or urban services--this may be the case.
But in both defense and health there has been a lot of Rand D, and technical
change has been extremely rapid.
and poorly screened.

But it also has been extremely expensive

My remarks above on the p~oclivity for expensive failures

in defense research and development apply. In health one has the strong
impression that one of the reasons for rising health costs has been the
procliv.ity of doctors and hospitals to adopt almost any plausible new thing-
drugs, surgical methods, equipment--that increases capability in any fimension
(and some for which that isn't even clear) without regard to cost.
The basic problem appears to reside in the screening and spreading mechanism
and seems inherent in a sector where for a variety of reasons full blown
consumer sovereignty is not possible or desirable and it is difficult to specify
a set of clear cut performance measures on which people can agree.

Most of the

traditional discussion, however, has been concerned with the characteristics
of equilibrium positions.

I would like to argue that if the world is like

Schumpeter's circular flow, one can conceive of a variety of mechanisms that
ultimately can move the decision rules of a public or not-for-profit firm towwd
those which reflect the public interest.
be slow but it would get you there.

The adjustment process~ clearly would

Thus I am arguing that the serious problems

of thsee feedback systems arise in a dynamic environment where change is
occurring or is demanded.
How do we go about improving the performance of our educational system?
The answer is not clear.

Clearly we want to get more new approaches and

programs tried out and evaluated.

It seems plausible that the design and funding
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of major experiments should be undertaken at the federal level.
does one really "evaluate"?

But how

Should success or failure be judged on

the basis of how well children or their parents like the program?

We long

have been leary of putting too much weight on this for a variety of read reasons.
What objective scores are relevant?

Clearly this is arguable.

I maintain

that with enough time and experimentation with a fixed number of alternatives
(and easy modifications) it would be possible to get wide spread agreement.
But this takes time.

And by the time we know how to evaluate the last

block of alternatives we are faced with a new block of alternatives and
conditions.
The point is salient in considering the new federal ventures toward
educational reform.

The nation~learly is beginning to put together the

apparatus for running a lot of experiments, which does seem to me in advance
regarding how to generate an interesting spectrum of innovations.

Two other

new proposed departures recognize the command and control over autonomous
units problem, and cut at it from antithetical points of view.

The educational

voucher idea tries to build up the power of consumer sovereignty, and suffers
from the variety of worries we have about this alluded to above.

The

pe~formance contracting route attempts to increase the mc,tiviting power of
those who think they can set objective standards, and indirectly to increase
incentives to imitate the experimental programs that score well by these
standards.

But the difficulties discussed above remain.

As an in-between version

one might well think of a voucher system, complemented by widely publicized
evaluation of schools' performances according to the proposed relevant measures,
to educate and inform parents~ All of these are important structural changes.
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They clearly will help to make the system more responsive and progressive
if we can solve the problem of evaluation, of distinguishing good departures
from poor ones.

But the "if" is basic and the solution to this is not going

to be easy.
These remarks were focused on education to be specific, but I suggest
they are applicable to a wide range of public and non-profit sectors.

I

make them not because I have a solution, but rather in the hope that the
appreciative theory of the problem may be useful, and because I think it
extremely important that more economists be working on these problems.
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